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ARGUMENT 
I. Response to Standards of Review, 
The parties agree on the standards of review on Issues 1, 2 and 4. However, for 
Issue #3 (Did Judge Quinn improperly reconsider Judge Hilder's Ruling on the mandate 
rule under the law-of-the-case doctrine?) the parties have presented differing authority. 
McLaughlin offered the correctness standard. Cookietree and Schenk state that the 
proper standard of review is abuse of discretion. 
In response, and to reply to the arguments in the Brief of Appellee, p. 21-23, 
McLaughlin believes the most correct and complete statement of the appropriate standard 
of review is found in In the matter o/RK, 2006 UT 36, f 32, 33; 137 P.3d 809. 
"A challenge to a judge's reversal of a ruling made by a predecessor judge 
is inevitably composed of two issues. The first concerns whether the 
reversal so offends the prudential practice of refusing to reopen matters that 
have already been decided that it cannot be sustained. Messenger v. 
Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). This question is central to evaluating 
the application of the law of the case doctrine and [] is ordinarily reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. The second component of an inquiry 
into a reversal of a prior order focuses on the nature of the matter decided. 
For example, if both the original ruling and the one that displaced it were 
based on applications of law each would be reviewed under a correctness 
standard. When a legal question is presented to an appellate court in law-
1 
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of-the-case packaging, a potential dilemma can arise over which standard of 
review to apply. We can identify no reason why an erroneous legal 
determination should be afforded greater discretion on appeal merely 
because it wears the garb of law of the case. For purposes of review, then, 
considerations of law of the case must yield to those of the substance of the 
underlying ruling when ascertaining the proper standard of review," 
So "[initially, [the appellate court] determines whether the trial judge abused his 
discretion in revisiting a matter previously decided by another judge. [T]hen [the 
appellate court] reviews the substance of the second judge's decision, which in this case is 
an issue of law that we review for correctness." In the matter ofR.B.F.S., 2012 UT App 
132,f8;278P.3dl43. 
Judge Quinn inherited a seven-year-old case. The issues on which he ruled had 
been (expensively and extensively) briefed and decided already. Rl815-2371 In the 
very first proceeding over which Judge Quinn presided, he made clear he would 
"certainly not take the same position that Judge Hilder did." R3502, p. 11 The reason 
this was an abuse of discretion is because he also stated "[t]he efforts to remedy what 
took place in 2005 have no effect on what ultimately happens in this case1 . . . " and "that 
remand instruction was explicit. Do I have any discretion at all to consider the other two 
possibilities that are set forth in the statute, one of which is director's action by qualified 
directors, the other [] of which is shareholder's action? I think that I do." R3503, p. 3 
^ 3 5 0 2 , p. 11 
2 
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Lower courts do not have discretion to consider other possibilities than those 
directed by a mandate. Lower courts (and parties) must follow mandates of the appellate 
court. Secondly, the "efforts to remedy what took place in 2005" is exactly what the 
holding of McLaughlin v. Schenk 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146 {"McLaughlin F or "the 
Opinion") was all about. In 2005 Schenk as a board member and shareholder attempted 
to waive the stock transfer restrictions and ratify the disputed stock transfer from which 
he personally benefitted. This economically harmed Sam McLaughlin. McLaughlin I, 
f38. If that action was fair (i.e. "beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and 
whether they satisfied the standard of fair dealing ") Sam McLaughlin will not be able to 
recover damages for being economically harmed. If, on the other hand, the 2005 Waivers 
are determined by a finder of fact to be unfair, McLaughlin /provides remedies for Sam 
McLaughlin. The Opinion cited the Judicial Action statute and the Model Act3. Id. 
Statutory remedies include "enjoin[ing] . . . set [ting the transaction] aside, or . . . an 
award of damages or other sanctions." Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-851(2). Under the 
Model Act, if a transaction is deemed to be unfair "the transaction may be subject to the 
full range of remedies that might apply." Model Business Corporation Act, Commentary, 
8-155. The Opinion also endorsed equitable relief. McLaughlin I fn4. 
Therefore Judge Quinn abused his discretion when he said "[t]he efforts to remedy 
what took place in 2005 have no effect on what ultimately happens in this case" and that 
McLaughlin /, f 3 8. 
This position on damages was argued and preserved in the record below at 
R2399-2400. 
3 
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i 
he had discretion on remand to look at other possibilities. Looking at the second layer, 
the correctness of his interpretation of the mandate, the standard of review also cannot be 
met. See Argument, p. 6 - 9 below. 
II. Response to Statement of the Case and Statements of Fact. ^ 
In their Brief, Cookietree and Schenk recharacterized and argued an interpretation 
of facts in the case prior to McLaughlin I and remand. Brief of Appellees, p. 3 - 6. 
\ 
These facts should no longer be at issue and should be controlled by the facts found in the 
Opinion, most relevantly contained in McLaughlin I f3, 6, 10, 11, 38. 
With regard to post-remand facts, McLaughlin strongly disputes the conclusion < 
that "Greg Schenk did not participate in the post remand actions." Brief of Appellees, p. 
7, 12. Indeed Greg Schenk initiated the 2009 Board action, which was done "at his 
i 
request." The post-remand Disclosure Statement, prepared by lawyers for Schenk and 
Cookietree and distributed to Cookietree shareholders, characterized the Opinion. 
R2870-71 Then, the Disclosure Statement stated: 
"Greg Schenk has requested that the Board and the Shareholders vote on 
whether or not to waive the Transfer Restriction Provisions." 
R2871 Greg Schenk was present at the Board meeting and discussed all the issues with 
the Board. Immediately after Rudd's allegedly "sole, disinterested vote" Greg Schenk 
ratified Rudd's actions and attested to the Minutes, where Greg Schenk's signature 
appears. R1833 
4 
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With respect to the 2010 Shareholder Action, Schenk again voted to waive the 
stock transfer provisions in the Shareholder Agreement. He did this because, before the 
2010 Shareholder Action could "constitute a waiver by the shareholders, Proposal 1 
needed to be approved by not less than two-thirds of all of the issued and outstanding 
shares, including Greg Schenk's shares..." Brief of Appellee, p. 14-15. 
It is not true, especially under the principles of close corporation duty set forth in 
McLaughlin /, for anyone to assert Greg Schenk did not participate in the post-remand 
action. 
III. Response to Arguments. 
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether or not the district court, 
Cookietree, Inc. and Greg Schenk followed the mandate(s)4 of this Court in McLaughlin 
I Tf 38 or violated it by procuring and recognizing the 2010 Waivers. On remand, the 
parties each interpreted the remand directive differently. McLaughlin presented his 
position to Judge Hilder, and he agreed with McLaughlin's view of the remand directive. 
Cookietree and Schenk later reargued the same issues, and Judge Quinn agreed with their 
interpretation. This appeal must resolve the question. 
4
 In addition to the mandate in [^38 remanding for a a fact-intensive fairness hearing, 
another mandate was contained in the Opinion: that Cookietree's "stockholders must 
discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with th[e] 
strict good faith standard. They may not act out of avarice, expediency or self-interest in 
derogation of their duty of loyalty to the other stockholders and the corporation." 
McLaughlin I [^18, 22. 
5 
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A. The Mandate in McLaughlin I. 
McLaughlin I did not remand for the majority shareholder and the corporation he 
controls to decide which option under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851(2)(a)-(c) they 
wished to apply. The mandate was for a fact-intensive fairness hearing to be held by the 
district court. The Opinion articulates the remand directive in four paragraphs: 
Paragraph 1: "we hold that waivers executed by the board and the 
shareholders of the corporation were contaminated by a conflict of interest, 
and we therefore remand for a determination of whether the waivers were 
fair." McLaughlin I ^ 1 . 
Paragraph 31: "we acknowledge the waivers were tainted by a conflict of 
interest and thereby remand for a determination of whether they were fair." 
M f 3 1 . 
Paragraph 38: "We therefore remand for a determination of whether the 
waivers were fair within the meaning of Utah Code section 16-10a-851, 
which is a fact-intensive inquiry focusing on whether the waivers were 
beneficial to the corporation and the shareholders and whether they 
satisfied the standard of fair dealing. See Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. ch. 8-
F, § 8.605." Id. f38. 
Paragraph 42: "we conclude that the waivers ratifying the 1999 share 
transfer were contaminated by a conflict of interest and remand for a 
determination of whether the waivers were fair." Id. <|42. 
In addition to following the plain meaning of these paragraphs, the McLaughlin / Judge 
Hilder interpretation also comports with both the "letter and the spirit" of the Opinion and 
"the circumstances it embraces." Utah Dep't Transportation v. Ivers, 2009 UT 56, f 12, 
218 P.3d 583; Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.} 2004 UT 34, [^5, 98 P.3d 409. 
5
 This portion of the Model Act cited in the Opinion defines and articulates the fairness 
standard and contains definitions. Section 8.60 does not discuss Directors Action or 
Shareholders action. See R2456-2473 (reproduced in the Addendum hereto). 
6 
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The reasoning behind the specific remand directive for a fairness hearing is found 
throughout the Opinion as a whole. 
Cookietree is a close corporation with 65% of the company's stock controlled by 
Greg Schenk, President of the Board. McLaughlin /, f 6. In 1998, Schenk was a 49% 
shareholder. Id. Schenk acquired 545,200 additional shares of Cookietree stock via the 
disputed stock transaction, bringing his ownership to 65%. Id. The disputed stock 
transfer did not conform to first right of refusal provisions in the controlling Shareholder 
Agreement. Id. p 1. McLaughlin sued for breach and to enforce the first right of refusal 
provisions. Id. ^ 10. 
The Shareholder Agreement allowed the share; transfer provisions to be waived, 
"upon the express written consent of the owners of at least two-thirds of the shares . . . 
(excluding those shares owned by the selling shareholder.)" Id. f30. So, in 2005, after 
McLaughlin sued for breach of the Shareholder Agreement, the full Board (including 
Schenk) and certain of the shareholders (including Schenk) voted to waive the first right 
of refusal provisions and ratify the disputed stock transfer. Id. fl 1. In so doing, "Schenk 
and the other board members and voting shareholders deprived the company and the 
nonvoting shareholders [McLaughlin] the economic opportunity to increase their 
investment in [Cookietree]. Id. f38. 
"Greg Schenk [] clearly had an economic interest in waiving the share transfer 
restrictions of the Shareholder Agreement..." Id. [^38. His participation "taints" and 
"contaminates" the waivers and ratifications. Id. f l , 31, 38, 42. A waiver by a two-thirds 
7 
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< 
shareholder vote is not possible because Greg Schenk owns 49% of all authorized 
Cookietree shares,6 excluding the 545,200 disputed shares. Any vote including Greg ' 
Schenk will be tainted. Any vote excluding Greg Schenk can't meet the two-thirds 
requirement in the Shareholder Agreement. This is why the Opinion (immediately before 
articulating the remand directive) noted that "[t]he [Shareholder] Agreement failed [] to 
foresee the possible conflicts presented when a buyer is already a corporate shareholder 
I 
and votes to waive the restrictions on share transfers." Id f38. Both Cookietree9s 
Shareholder Agreement and corporate law are "wary of such self dealing." Id. f38. The 
2010 Shareholder vote is just as tainted and problematic as the 2005 Shareholder vote by < 
the unavoidable participation of Greg Schenk. McLaughlin I foresaw this when it 
mandated the fairness hearing. 
In contrast to this reasoned approach, Cookietree and Schenk's analysis of the 
remand directive ignores the letter and spirit and also the circumstances of the Opinion. 
The one sentence relied upon by Cookietree and Schenk in support of their interpretation { 
of the remand directive is found in paragraph 37. That sentence does not contain the 
word "remand;" indeed, the sentence is a description of subsections (a) (b) and (c) of 
Section 851(2): "The procedures provided in the conflict of interest statute most 
appropriately address nontransaction-related conflict situations because they do not 
i 
automatically invalidate conflict of interest transactions but instead require the party with 
6
 This pivotal point was conceded by Cookietree and Schenk on remand and in its present 
Brief. R1917; Brief of Appellees, p. 14-15,27 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a conflict to [a.] show the transaction was fair, or [b.] require the vote of disinterested 
board members or [c require the vote of] disinterested shareholders to ratify the 
transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-851 (2005)." The Opinion never cites Section 
852 or 853, where Directors Action and Shareholders Action are described. This 
sentence does not "specifically authorize" the path Greg Schenk and Cookietree took on 
remand. The remand sentences of this Court's opinion all refer to the fairness 
determination, a separate subsection. McLaughlin I, p , 31, 38, 42. 
The Utah Supreme Court best knows what it intended by the mandate in 
McLaughlin L Greg Schenk, Cookietree and Judge Quinn diverted from that mandate 
and instead took alternative and "discretionary" measures. Sam McLaughlin should be 
given the full, hard fought benefit of McLaughlin /when this matter is remanded a 
second time. 
B. Not Only Did the Post-Remand Board Action and 
Director's Action Thwart the Mandate, But Those 
Actions Were Themselves Flawed. 
1. The Fatal Flaws with the 2009 Board Action. 
Cookietree's Board has only three directors: Greg Schenk, Harold 
Rosemann and David Rudd. In the (20 minute) post-remand board meeting, all three 
were present, constituting a quorum. R1829 All three directors including Schenk 
engaged in a discussion of the disputed stock transfer, the Opinion and the proposed 
waivers and ratifications. Rl829-1830 Two board members (Schenk and Rosemann) 
then abstained from voting, citing conflict of interest. Rl 829-1830 The action then 
9 
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1 
undertaken, by Rudd alone, to ratify the 2005 Waivers and presently waive the stock 
transfer provisions in the Shareholder's Agreement violated Cookietree's Bylaws and 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-824(3). To be a valid act of the Board, the action of a majority 
of directors present was required. R1856 A majority of the directors present at the post-
remand Board meeting did not vote; a majority of directors present abstained 
In addition to this facial flaw, McLaughlin also launched a substantive 
attack on the adequacy of Rudd's knowledge and information. On appeal, McLaughlin 
has properly marshaled the disputed facts surrounding the adequacy of the disclosures 
made to Rudd and in his basic understanding of the facts. Opening Brief p. 20-23. The \ 
Brief of Appellee accuses undersigned counsel of "blatantly mischaracterizing" the 
deposition of David Rudd. The record shows that David Rudd was deposed through the 
use of open-ended questions, designed to discover what Mr. Rudd actually knew or 
understood about the issues. R2324-2347 An illustrative example is: 
10 
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Question to Mr. Rudd 
Could you describe th[e 
disputed stock] transfer of 
Cookietree shares for me? 
R2326, p. 6 
Do you know or are you 
able to tell me whether the 
transfer provisions in the 
19997 shareholder 
agreement were followed 
in the case of the transfer 
between Anna Schenk and 
Greg Schenk in 1999? 
R2329, p. 18 
Mr. Rudd's Answer 
The shares were offered to the 
company, the company went 
through a process of 
reviewing who was entitled to 
purchase those shares. . . . 
The board at the time, from 
what I can see, went through a 
process of evaluating the; 
respective rights of the 
company, and the shareholder 
had obtained the waivers, both 
on a board level and a 
shareholder's level, to the 
stock transfer provisions and 
Mr. Schenk purchased the 
shares. That's my 
understanding. 
I don't know. 
Accuracy 
Completely wrong. 
"This transfer was 
not recorded in 
Cookietree's minutes 
or written records, 
and a right of first 
refusal was not 
provided to the j 




issued. At the time 
this transfer was 
made, it violated the 
1991 Shareholder 
Agreement. 
McLaughlin I, }^6. 
After Rudd testified for over an hour in response to open ended questions, his counsel 
asked to take a break. R2335 Mr. Rudd (after confemng with counsel) corrected his 
7
 As noted in the Opinion, the provisions in the 1991 and 1999 Shareholders Agreements 
are identical. McLaughlin /, [^30, 32. 
11 
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testimony and more accurately described events. A fair reading of Mr. Rudd's deposition 
as a whole indicates that he did not have an independent grasp on the basic factual 
elements of these issues. He parroted what counsel told him, both in and out of the 
deposition. A reading of the deposition as a whole supports this conclusion, which Sam 
McLaughlin and undersigned counsel stand behind here. 
After Rudd's sole (misinformed, puppeted) action, Greg Schenk and Harold 
Rosemann (who minutes earlier acknowledged their conflict of interest) ratified the 
ratification of the 2005 Waivers and the new, present waiver of the stock transfer 
provisions. Rl 830-1831 To allow disqualified directors to discuss, then abstain, then 
ratify summary board action is the elevation of form over substance in its worst form. It 
mocks the other holding of McLaughlin I: that Schenk, Rosemann and the other 
shareholders in Cookietree "owe[] McLaughlin individually a duty to act in the utmost 
o 
good faith ." McLaughlin I f l . 
2. The Fatal Flaws with the 2010 Shareholder Action. 
As set forth above, the 2010 Shareholder Action was tainted by Greg 
Schenk's participation and any shareholder action purporting to waive the share transfer 
restrictions will necessarily be either tainted or fail to meet the two-thirds requirement. 
The fact that the so-called "Election Judge" (the same Harold Rosemann who disqualified 
8
 McLaughlin has never argued there is a new, post-remand unpled cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duty. C.f Brief of Appellee, p. 23-26. Instead, McLaughlin argued 
below that to uphold the post-remand waivers and ratifications would violate this holding 
of McLaughlin /which also binds the parties and the court below. R1825, R3003-3004, 
R3502, p. 9-10, R3503, p. 13-14, 22 
12 
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himself for conflict of interest in the post-remand Board meeting) tallied the votes with 
and without Greg Schenk's votes is of no consequence. The Shareholder Agreement 
requires that two thirds of the shareholders not including the selling shareholder must 
vote to effectively waive the stock transfer restrictions. R2565, 2569 This can never 
happen without Greg Schenk. 
As to the other post-remand shareholder votes and ratification, the Opinion 
recognized that, in this close corporation, it would be impossible to put the genie back in 
the bottle. By the time of remand, the dispute over Greg Schenk's undisclosed 
acquisition of the 545,200 shares had been plaguing McLaughlin, Cookietree and its 
closed group of shareholders for seven years. Everyone is well aware of this proceeding. 
With one exception, the post-remand Cookietree shareholders who voted are current at-
will employees of Greg Schenk. R2124 They are all very much aware Sam McLaughlin 
was terminated from Cookietree employment when he disagreed with and challenged 
Greg Schenk. At the post-remand Board meeting, Harold Rosemann (a shareholder, 
director and employee) "stated that although he did not believe that his status as an 
employee of the Company would exert any influence on his vote as a director, he did 
acknowledge that his relationship with Greg Schenk likely could have an influence on his 
vote and create a conflict of interest for him in voting." Rl 829-1830 It is difficult to see 
why, after acknowledging one shareholder/employee could be unduly influenced by Greg 
Schenk and a conflict of interest created but other shareholder/employees would not be 
13 
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1 
so-influenced. The only way to reasonably resolve this dispute and the issues created by 
Greg Schenk's self-interested actions is through a fairness hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should remand for a fairness hearing per the mandate of McLaughlin L
 { 
To hold otherwise now would sanction Schenk's and Cookietree's shell game, which 
lacked the elements of good faith and fair dealing. Greg Schenk's procurement of and 
participation in the post-remand waiver and ratification action should not be allowed to 
stand in light of this Court's prior holdings and mandate. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ATTACHMENTS 
Undersigned counsel hereby certifies that the materials attached hereto as 
Addendum A are part of the record on remand. Utah R. App P. 24(a)(4). 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
Appellant's Reply Brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. 
P. 24(f)(1)(A) because it contains 3,385 words, excluding the caption, Table of Contents 
and Table of Authorities. 
DATED this 17th day of September, 2012. 
Margaret H. Olson, Esq., Of Counsel 
Lincoln W. Hobbs, Esq. 
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant Sam McLaughlin 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies, along with a disc, of 
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to be delivered as follows: 
H^ail 
[] Fax 
[ ] Email 
[ ] Fed Ex 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Personally Served 
Matthew M. Durham 
Justin E. Palmer 
STOEL RIVES, L.L.P. 
201 South Main Street, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Fax No. 578-6999 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Greg Schenk and Cookietree, 
Inc. 
J^MHil 
[ ] Fax 
[ ] Email 
[ ] Fed Ex 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Personally Served 
Richard D. Flint 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
222 South Main Street, #2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Fax No. 801-799-5700 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Anna Schenk and Estate of Boyd 
Schenk 




Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM "A" 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
Subchapter F. 
DIRECTORS1 CONFLICTING INTEREST 
TRANSACTIONS 
1. PURPOSES AND SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF 
SUBCHAPTER F 
The common law, drawing by analogy on the fiduciary prin-
ciples of the law of trusts, initially took the position that any 
transaction between a corporation and a director of that corpo-
ration was contaminated by the director's conflicting interest, that 
the transaction was null and void or at least voidable and, sug-
gesting by implication, that the interested director who benefited 
from the transaction could be required to disgorge any profits and 
be held liable for any damages. 
Eventually, it was perceived that a flat( void/voidable rule 
could work against a corporation's best interests. Although self-
interested transactions carry a potential for injury to the corpo-
ration, they also carry a potential for benefit. A director who is 
self-interested may nevertheless act fairly, and there may be cases 
where a director either owns a unique asset that the corporation 
needs or is willing to offer the corporation more favorable terms 
than are available on the market (for example, where the director 
is more confident of the corporation's financial ability to perform 
than a third person would be). Accordingly, the courts dropped 
the flat void/voidable rule, and substituted in its stead the rule 
that a self-interested transaction will be upheld if the director 
shoulders the burden of showing that the transaction was fair. 
Later still, the Model Act and the state legislatures entered 
the picture by adopting statutory provisions that sheltered the 
transaction from any challenge that the transaction was void or 
voidable where it was approved by disinterested directors or 
shareholders. Until 1989, the successive Model Act provisions 
concerning director conflict-of-interest transactions and the stat-
utory provisions in force in most states reflected basically the 
same objective; that is, their safe-harbor procedures concentrated 
on protection for the transaction, with no attention given to the 
possible vulnerability of the director whose conflicting interest 
would give rise to the transaction's potential challenge. However, 
in 1989 the relevant provisions were significantly reworked in 
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subchapter F of Chapter 8. Four basic elements in the architecture 
of the 1989 version of subchapter F distinguished the approach 
of the subchapter from most other statutory provisions of the time. 
First, most other statutory provisions did not define what con-
stituted a director's conflict-of-interest transaction. In contrast, 
subchapter F defined, with bright-line rules, the transactions that 
were to be treated as director's conflict-of-interest transactions. 
Second, because most other statutory provisions did not de-
fine what constitutes a director's conflict-of-interest transaction, 
they left open how to deal with transactions that involved only a 
relatively minor conflict. In contrast, subchapter F explicitly pro-
vided that a director's transaction that was not within the statutory 
definition of a director's conflict of interest transaction was not 
subject to judicial review for fairness on the ground that it in-
volved a conflict of interest (although circumstances that fall out-
side the statutory definition could, of course, afford the basis for 
a legal attack on the transaction on some other ground), even if 
the transaction involved some sort of conflict lying outside the 
statutory definition, such as a remote familial relationship. 
Third, subchapter F made explicit, as many other statutory 
provisions did not, that if a director's conflict-of-interest trans-
action, as defined, was properly approved by disinterested (or 
"qualified") directors or shareholders, the transaction was 
thereby insulated from judicial review for fairness (although, 
again, it might be open to attack on some basis other than the 
conflict). 
Fourth, subchapter F also made explicit, as no other statutory 
provisions had done, that if a director's conflict-of-interest trans-
action, as defined, was properly approved by disinterested (or 
"qualified") directors or shareholders,' the conflicted director 
could not be subject to an award of damages or other sanctions 
with respect thereto (although the director could be subject to 
claims on some basis other than the conflict). 
Bright-line provisions of any kind represent a trade-off be-
tween the benefits of certainty, and the danger that some trans-
actions or conduct that fall outside the area circumscribed by the 
bright-lines may be so similar to the transactions and conduct that 
fall within the area that different treatment may seem anomalous. 
Subchapter F reflected the considered judgment that in corporate 
matters, where planning is critical, the clear and important effi-
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ciency gains that result from certainty through defining director's 
conflict-of-interest transactions clearly exceeded any potential 
and uncertain efficiency losses that might occasionally follow 
from excluding other director's transactions from judicial review 
for fairness on conflict-of-interest grounds. 
The 2004 revisions of subchapter F rest on the same basic 
judgment that animated the original subchapter. Accordingly, the 
revisions made do not alter the fundamental elements and ap-
proach of the subchapter. However, the revisions refine the def-
inition of director's conflict-of-interest transactions, simplify the 
text of the statute, and, within the basic approach of the original 
subchapter, make various clarifying and substantive changes 
throughout the text and comments. One of these substantive 
changes expands the category of persons whose interest in a trans-
action will be attributed to the director for purposes; of subchapter 
F. At the same time, the revisions delete coverage of a director's 
interest that lies outside the transaction itself but might be deemed 
to be "closely related to the transaction." The latter phraseology 
was determined to be excessively vague and unhelpful. In com-
bination, these revisions clarify the coverage of subchapter F, 
while ensuring that a transaction that poses a significant risk of 
adversely affecting a director's judgment will not escape statutory 
coverage. 
2. SCOPE OF SUBCHAPTER F 
The focus of subchapter F is sharply defined and limited. 
First, the subchapter is targeted on legal challenges based on 
interest conflicts only. Subchapter F does not undertake to define, 
regulate, or provide any form of procedure regarding other pos-
sible claims. For example, subchapter F does not address a claim 
that a controlling shareholder has violated a duty owed to the 
corporation or minority shareholders. 
Second, subchapter F does not shield misbehavior by a direc-
tor or other person that is actionable under other provisions of 
the Model Act, such as section 8.31, or under other legal rules, 
regardless of whether the misbehavior is incident to a transaction 
with the corporation and regardless of whether the rule is one of 
corporate law. 
Third, subchapter F does not preclude the assertion of de-
fenses, such as statute of limitations or failure of a condition 
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precedent, that are based on grounds other than a director's con-
flicting interest in the transaction. 
Fourth, the subchapter is applicable only when there is a 
"transaction" by or with the corporation. For purposes of sub-
chapter F, "transaction" generally connotes negotiations or con-
sensual arrangements between the corporation and another party 
or parties that concern their respective and differing economic 
rights or interests—not simply a unilateral action by the corpo-
ration or a director, but rather a "deal." Whether safe harbor 
procedures of some kind might be available to the director and 
the corporation with respect to non-transactional matters is dis-
cussed in numbered paragraph 4 of this Introductory Comment. 
Fifth, subchapter F deals with directors only. Correspond-
ingly, subchapter F does not deal with controlling shareholders 
in their capacity as such. If a corporation is wholly owned by a 
parent corporation or other person, there are no outside share-
holders who might be injured as a result of transactions entered 
into between the corporation and the owner of its shares. How-
ever, transactions between a corporation and a parent corporation 
or other controlling shareholder who owns less than all of its 
shares may give rise to the possibility of abuse of power by the 
controlling shareholder. Subchapter F does not speak to proceed-
ings brought on that basis because section 8.61 concerns only 
proceedings that are brought on the ground that a "director has 
an interest respecting the transaction." 
Sixth, it is important to stress that the voting procedures and 
conduct standards prescribed in subchapter F deal solely with the 
complicating element presented by the director's conflicting in-
terest. A transaction that receives favorable directors' or share-
holders' action complying with subchapter F may still fail to sat-
isfy a different quorum requirement or to achieve a different vote 
that may be needed for substantive approval of the transaction 
under other applicable statutory provisions or under the articles 
of incorporation, and vice versa. (Under the Model Act, latitude 
is granted for setting higher voting requirements and different 
quorum requirements in the articles of incorporation. See sections 
2.02(b)(2) and 7.27.) 
Seventh, a few corporate transactions or arrangements in 
which directors inherently have a special personal interest are of 
a unique character and are regulated by special procedural pro-
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visions of the Model Act. See sections 8.51 and 8.52 dealing with 
indemnification arrangements, section 7.44 dealing with termi-
nation of derivative proceedings by board action and section 8.11 
dealing with directors' compensation. Any corporate transactions 
or arrangements affecting directors that are governed by such 
regulatory sections of the Act are not governed by subchapter F. 
3, STRUCTURE OF SUBCHAPTER F 
Subchapter F has only four parts. Definitions are in section 
8.60. Section 8.61 prescribes what a court may or may not do in 
various situations. Section 8.62 prescribes procedures for action 
by boards of directors or duly authorized committees regarding a 
director's conflicting interest transaction. Section 8.63 prescribes 
corresponding procedures for shareholders. Thus, the most im-
portant operative section of the subchapter is section 8.61. 
4. NON-TRANSACTIONAL SITUATIONS INVOLVING 
INTEREST CONFLICTS 
Many situations arise in which a director's personal economic 
interest is or may be adverse to the economic interest of the cor-
poration, but which do not entail a "transaction" by or with the 
corporation. How does the subchapter bear upon those situations? 
Corporate opportunity 
The corporate opportunity doctrine is anchored in a signifi-
cant body of case law clustering around the core question whether 
the corporation has a legitimate interest in a business opportunity, 
either because of the nature of the opportunity or the way in which 
the opportunity came to the director, of such a nature that the 
corporation should be afforded prior access to the opportunity 
before it is pursued (or, to use the case law's phrase, "usurped") 
by a director. Because judicial determinations in this area often 
seem to be driven by the particular facts of a case, outcomes are 
often difficult to predict. 
The subchapter, as such, does not apply by its terms to cor-
porate or business opportunities since no transaction between the 
corporation and the director is involved in the taking of an op-
portunity. However, new subchapter G of chapter 8 of the Model 
Act provides, in effect, that the safe harbor procedures of section 
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8.62 or 8.63 may be employed, at the interested director's elec-
tion, to protect the taking of a business opportunity that might be 
challenged under the doctrine. Otherwise, subchapter F has no 
bearing on enterprise rights or director obligations under the cor-
porate opportunity doctrine. 
Other situations 
Many other kinds of situations can give rise to a clash of 
economic interests between a director and the corporation. For 
example, a director's personal financial interests can be impacted 
by a non-transactional policy decision of the board, such as where 
it decides to establish a divisional headquarters in the director's 
small hometown. In other situations, simple inaction by a board 
might work to a director's personal advantage, or a flow of on-
going business relationships between a director and that director's 
corporation may, without centering upon any discrete "transac-
tion," raise questions of possible favoritism, unfair dealing, or 
undue influence. If a director decides to engage in business ac-
tivity that directly competes with the corporation's own business, 
the economic interest in that competing activity ordinarily will 
conflict with the best interests of the corporation and put in issue 
the breach of the director's duties to the corporation. Basic con-
flicts and improprieties can also arise out of a director's personal 
appropriation of corporate assets or improper use of corporate 
proprietary or inside information. 
The circumstances in which such non-transactional conflict 
situations should be brought to the board or shareholders for 
clearance, and the legal effect, if any, of such clearance, are mat-
ters for development under the common law and lie outside the 
ambit of subchapter F. While these non-transactional situations 
are unaffected one way or the other by the provisions of sub-
chapter F, a court may well recognize that the subchapter F pro-
cedures provide a useful analogy for dealing with such situations. 
Where similar procedures are followed, the court may, in its dis-
cretion, accord to them an effect similar to that provided by sub-
chapter F. 
* * * 
Note on Terms in Comment 
In the Official Comments to subchapter F sections, the direc-
tor who has a conflicting interest is for convenience referred to 
8-139 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
as "the director" or "D," and the corporation of which he or 
she is a director is referred to as "the corporation" or "X Co." 
A subsidiary of the corporation is referred to as "S Co." Another 
corporation dealing with X Co. is referred to as 4TCo." 
§8,60. SUBCHAPTER DEFINITIONS 
In this subchapter: 
(1) "Director's conflicting interest transaction" means a 
transaction effected or proposed to be effected by the 
corporation (or by an entity controlled by the corpo-
ration) 
(i) to which, at the relevant time, the director is a 
party; or 
(ii) respecting which, at the relevant time, the director 
had knowledge and a material financial interest 
known to the director; or 
(iii) respecting which, at the relevant timie, the director 
knew that a related person was a party or had a 
material financial interest. 
(2) "Control" (including the term "controlled by") means 
(i) having the power, directly or indirectly, to elect or 
remove a majority of the members of the board of di-
rectors or other governing body of an entity, whether 
through the ownership of voting shares or interests, by 
contract, or otherwise, or (ii) being subject to a majority 
of the risk of loss from the entity's activities or entitled 
to receive a majority of the entit/s residual returns. 
(3) "Relevant time" means (i) the time at which directors' 
action respecting the transaction is taken in compli-
ance with section 8.62, or (ii) if the transaction is not 
brought before the board of directors of the corpora-
tion (or its committee) for action under section 8.62, 
at the time the corporation (or an entity controlled by 
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the corporation) becomes legally obligated to consum-
mate the transaction. 
"Material financial interest" means a financial interest 
in a transaction that would reasonably be expected to 
impair the objectivity of the director's judgment when 
participating in action on the authorization of the trans-
action. 
"Related person" means: 
(i) the director's spouse; 
(ii) a child, stepchild, grandchild, parent, step parent, 
grandparent, sibling, step sibling, half sibling, 
aunt, uncle, niece or nephew (or spouse of any 
thereof) of the director or of the director's spouse; 
(Hi) an individual living in the same home as the di-
rector; 
(iv) an entity (other than the corporation or an entity 
controlled by the corporation) controlled by the 
director or any person specified above in this sub-
division (5); 
(v) a domestic or foreign (A) business or nonprofit 
corporation (other than the corporation or an en-
tity controlled by the corporation) of which the 
director is a director, (B) unincorporated entity of 
which the director is a general partner or a mem-
ber of the governing body, or (C) individual, trust 
or estate for whom or of which the director is a 
trustee, guardian, personal representative or like 
fiduciary; or 
(vi) a person that is, or an entity that is controlled by, 
an employer of the director, 
"Fair to the corporation" means, for purposes of sec-
tion 8.61 (b)(3), that the transaction as a whole was 
beneficial to the corporation, taking into appropriate 
account whether it was (i) fair in terms of the director's 
dealings with the corporation, and (ii) comparable to 
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what might have been obtainable in an arm's length 
transaction, given the consideration paid or received by 
the corporation. 
(7) "Required disclosure" means disclosure of (i) the ex-
istence and nature of the director's conflicting interest, 
and (ii) all facts known to the director respecting the 
subject matter of the transaction that a director free of 
such conflicting interest would reasonably believe to 
be material in deciding whether to proceed with the 
transaction. 
CROSS-REFERENCES 
Committees of board of directors, see § 8.25. 
Director action, see §§ 8.20 & 8.21. 
"Entity" defined, see § 1.40. 
Indemnification, see §§ 8.50-8.59. 
"Proceeding" defined, see § 1.40. 
Quorum and voting: 
by directors, see § 8.24. 
by shareholders, see §§ 7.25-7.27. 
Shareholder action, see §§ 7.01-7.04. 
Standards of conduct: 
officers, see § 8.42. 
Vote needed to approve transactions by shareholders: 
amendment to articles of incorporation, see § 10.03. 
disposition of assets, see § 12.02. 
generally, see §§ 7.25 & 7.26. 
mergers and share exchanges, see § 11.04. 
"Voting group" defined, see § 1.40. 
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OFFICIAL COMMENT 
The definitions set forth in section 8.60 apply only to sub-
chapter F's provisions and, except to the extent relevant to sub-
chapter G, have no application elsewhere in the Model Act. (For 
the meaning and use of certain terms used below, such as "D," 
"XCo." and "KCo.",see the Note at the end of the Introductory 
Comment of subchapter F.) 
1. DIRECTOR'S CONFLICTING INTEREST TRANSACTION 
The definition of "director's conflicting interest transaction" 
in subdivision (1) is the core concept underlying subchapter F, 
demarcating the transactional area that lies within—and with-
out—the scope of the subchapter's provisions. The definition op-
erates preclusively in that, as used in section 8.61, it denies the 
power of a court to invalidate transactions or otherwise to remedy 
conduct that falls outside the statutory definition of "director's 
conflicting interest transaction" solely on the ground that the di-
rector has a conflict of interest in the transaction. (Nevertheless, 
as stated in the Introductory Comment, the transaction might be 
open to attack under rules of law concerning director misbehavior 
other than rules based solely on the existence of a conflict of 
interest transaction, as to which subchapter F is preclusive). 
a. Transaction 
For a director's conflicting interest transaction to arise, there 
must first be a transaction effected or proposed to be effected by 
the corporation or an entity controlled by the corporation to which 
the director or a related person is a party or in which the director 
or a related person has a material financial interest. As discussed 
in the Introductory Comment, the provisions of subchapter F do 
not apply where there is no "transaction" by the corporation— 
no matter how conflicting the director's interest may be. For ex-
ample, a corporate opportunity usurped by a director by definition 
does not involve a transaction by the corporation, and thus is not 
covered by subchapter F, even though it may be proscribed under 
fiduciary duty principles. 
Moreover, for purposes of subchapter F, "transaction" means 
(and requires) a bilateral (or multilateral) arrangement to which 
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the corporation or an entity controlled by the corporation is a 
party. Subchapter F does not apply to transactions to which the 
corporation is not a party. Thus, a purchase or sale by the director 
of die corporation's shares on the open market or from or to a 
third party is not a "director's conflicting interest transaction" 
within the meaning of subchapter F because the corporation is 
not a party to the transaction. 
b. Party to the transaction—the corporation 
In the usual case, the transaction would be effected by X Co. 
Assume, however, that X Co. controls the vote for directors of S 
Co. D wishes to sell a building D owns to X Co. and X Co. is 
willing to buy it. As a business matter, it makes no difference to 
X Co. whether it takes the title directly or indirectly through its 
subsidiary S Co. or some other entity that X Co. controls. The 
applicability of subchapter F does not depend upon that formal 
distinction, because the subchapter includes within its operative 
framework transactions by entities controlled by XCo. Thus, sub-
chapter F would apply to a sale of the building by D to S Co. 
c. Party to the transaction—the director or a related person 
To constitute a director's conflicting interest transaction, D 
(the director identified in the subchapter from time to time as a 
"conflicted director") must, at the relevant time, (i) be a party to 
the transaction, or (ii) know of the transaction and D's material 
financial interest in it, or (iii) know that a related peirson of D was 
a party to the transaction or (iv) know that a related person of D 
has a material financial interest in the transaction. A material 
financial interest (as defined in subdivision (4)) is one that would 
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director's 
judgment if D were to participate in action by the directors (or 
by a committee thereof) taken on the authorization of the trans-
action. 
Routine business transactions frequently occur between com-
panies with overlapping directors. If X Co. and Y Co. have rou-
tine, frequent business dealings whose terms are dictated by com-
petitive market forces, then even if a director of .X" Co. has a 
relevant relationship with Y Co., the transactions would almost 
always be defensible, regardless of approval by disinterested di-
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rectors or shareholders, on the ground that they are "fair." For 
example, a common transaction involves a purchase of the cor-
poration's product line by Y Co., or perhaps by D or a related 
person, at prices normally charged by the corporation. In such 
circumstances, it usually will not be difficult for D to show that 
the transaction was on arms-length terms and was fair. Even a 
purchase by D of a product of X Co. at a usual "employee's 
discount," while technically assailable as a conflicting interest 
transaction, would customarily be viewed as a routine incident of 
the office of director and, thus, "fair" to the corporation. 
D can have a conflicting interest in only two ways. 
First, a conflicting interest can arise under either subdivision 
(l)(i) or (ii). This will be the case if, under clause (i), the trans-
action is between D and X Co. A conflicting interest also will 
arise under clause (ii) if D is not a party to the transaction, but 
knows about it and knows that he or she has a material financial 
interest in it. The personal economic stake of the director must 
be in the transaction itself—that is, the director's gain must flow 
directly from the transaction. A remote gain (for example, a future 
reduction in tax rates in the local community) is not enough to 
give rise to a conflicting interest under subdivision (l)(ii). 
Second, a conflicting interest for D can arise under subdivi-
sion (l)(iii) from the involvement in the transaction of a "related 
person" of D that is either a party to the transaction or has a 
"material financial interest" in it. "Related person" is defined 
in subdivision (5). 
Circumstances may arise where a director could have a con-
flicting interest under more than one clause of subdivision (1). 
For example, if Y Co. is a party to or interested in the transaction 
with X Co. and Y Co. is a related person of D, the matter would 
be governed by subdivision (l)(iii), but D also may have a con-
flicting interest under subdivision (l)(ii) if D's economic interest 
in Y Co. is sufficiently material and if the importance of the trans-
action to Y Co. is sufficiently material. 
A director may have relationships and linkages to persons and 
institutions that are not specified in subdivision (l)(iii). Such re-
lationships and linkages fall outside subchapter F because the 
categories of persons described in subdivision (l)(iii) constitute 
the exclusive universe for purposes of subchapter F. For example, 
in a challenged transaction between X Co. and Y Co., suppose the 
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court confronts the argument that D also is a major creditor of Y 
Co. and that creditor status in YCo. gives D a conflicting interest. 
The court should rule that Z)'s creditor status in Y Co. does not 
fit any category of subdivision (1); and therefore, the conflict of 
interest claim must be rejected by reason of section 8.61(a). The 
result would be different if Y Co.'s debt to D were of such eco-
nomic significance to D that it would either fall under subdivision 
(l)(ii) or, if it placed D in control of Y Co., it would fall under 
subdivision (l)(iii) (because KCo. is a related person of D under 
subdivision (5)(iv)). To explore the example ftirther, if D is also 
a shareholder of Y Co., but D does not have a material financial 
interest in the transaction and does not control YCo., no director's 
conflicting interest transaction arises and the transaction cannot 
be challenged on conflict of interest grounds. To avoid any ap-
pearance of impropriety, D, nonetheless, should consider recusal 
from the other directors' deliberations and voting on the trans-
action between X Co. and Y Co. 
It should be noted that any director's interest in a transaction 
that meets the criteria of section 8.60(1) is considered a "direc-
tor's conflicting interest transaction." If the director's interest 
satisfies those criteria, subchapter F draws no distinction between 
a director's interest that clashes with the interests of the corpo-
ration and a director's interest that coincides with, or is parallel 
to, or even furthers the interests of the corporation. In any of these 
cases, if the director's "interest" is present, a "conflict" will 
exist. 
2, CONTROL 
The definition of "control" in subdivision (2) contains two 
independent clauses. The first clause addresses possession of the 
voting or other power, directly or indirectly, to elect or remove a 
majority of the members of an entity's governing body. That 
power can arise, for example, from articles of incoiporation or a 
shareholders' agreement. The second clause addresses the cir-
cumstances where a person is (i) subject to a majority of the risk 
of loss from the entity's activities, or (ii) entitled to receive a 
majority of the entity's residual returns. The second clause of the 
definition includes, among other circumstances, complex finan-
cial structures that do not have voting interests or a governing 
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body in the traditional sense, such as special purpose entities. 
Although the definition of "control" operates independently of 
the accounting rules adopted by the U.S. accounting profession, 
it is consistent with the relevant generally accepted accounting 
principle (made effective in 2003) that governs when an entity 
must be included in consolidated financial statements. 
3. RELEVANT TIME 
The definition of director's conflicting interest transaction re-
quires that, except where he or she is a party, the director know 
of the transaction. It also requires that where not a party, the 
director know of the transaction either at the time it is brought 
before the corporation's board of directors or, if it is not brought 
before the corporation's board of directors (or a committee 
thereof), at the time the corporation (or an entity controlled by 
the corporation) becomes legally bound to consummate the trans-
action. Where the director lacks such knowledge, the risk to the 
corporation that the director's judgment might be improperly in-
fluenced, or the risk of unfair dealing by the director, is not pres-
ent. In a corporation of significant size, routine transactions in 
the ordinary course of business, which typically involve deci-
sionmaking at lower management levels, normally will not be 
known to the director and, if that is the case, will be excluded 
from the "knowledge" requirement of the definition in subdivi-
sion (l)(ii) or (iii). 
4. MATERIAL FINANCIAL INTEREST 
The "interest" of a director or a related person in a transac-
tion can be direct or indirect (e.g., as an owner of an entity or a 
beneficiary of a trust or estate), but it must be financial for there 
to exist a "director's conflicting interest transaction." Thus, for 
example, an interest in a transaction between X Co. and a direc-
tor's alma mater, or any other transaction involving X Co. and a 
party with which D might have emotional involvement but no 
financial interest, would not give rise to a director's conflicting 
interest transaction. Moreover, whether a financial interest is ma-
terial does not turn on any assertion by the possibly conflicted 
director that the interest in question would not impair his or her 
objectivity if called upon to vote on the authorization of the trans-
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action. Instead, assuming a court challenge asserting the materi-
ality of the financial interest, the standard calls upon the trier of 
fact to determine whether the objectivity of a reasonable director 
in similar circumstances would reasonably be expected to have 
been impaired by the financial interest when voting on the matter. 
Thus, the standard is objective, not subjective. 
Under subdivision (l)(ii), at the relevant time at director must 
have knowledge of his or her financial interest in the transaction 
in addition to knowing about the transaction itself. As a practical 
matter, a director could not be influenced by a financial interest 
about which that director had no knowledge. For example, the 
possibly conflicted director might know about X Co.'s transaction 
With Y Co., but might not know that his or her money manager 
recently established a significant position in Y Co. stock for the 
director's portfolio. In such circumstances, the transaction with 
Y Co. would not give the director a "material financial interest", 
notwithstanding the portfolio investment's significance. Analyt-
ically, if the director did not know about the Y Co. portfolio in-
vestment, it could not reasonably be expected to impair the ob-
jectivity of that director's judgment. 
Similarly, under subdivision (l)(iii), a director must know 
about his or her related person's financial interest in the trans-
action for the matter to give rise to a' 'material financial interest" 
under subdivision (4). If there is such knowledge and "interest" 
{i.e., the financial interest could be expected to influence the di-
rector's judgment), then the matter involves a director's conflict-
ing interest transaction under subdivision (1). 
5. RELATED PERSON 
Six categories of "related person" of the director are set out 
in subdivision (5). These categories are specific, exclusive and 
preemptive. 
The first three categories involve closely related family, or 
near-family, individuals as specified in clauses (i) through (iii). 
The clauses are exclusive insofar as family relationships are con-
cerned and include adoptive relationships. The references to a 
"spouse" include a common law spouse. Clause (iii) covers per-
sonal, as opposed to business, relationships; for example, clause 
(iii) does not cover a lessee. 
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Regarding the subcategories of persons described in clause 
(v) from the perspective of X Co., certain of D's relationships 
with other entities and D's fiduciary relationships are always a 
sensitive concern, separate and apart from whether D has a fi-
nancial interest in the transaction. Clause (v) reflects the policy 
judgment that D cannot escape D's legal obligation to act in the 
best interests of another person for whom D has such a relation-
ship and, accordingly, that such a relationship (without regard to 
any financial interest on D*s part) should cause the relevant entity 
to have "related person** status. 
The term "employer*' as used in subdivision (5)(vi) is not 
separately defined but should be interpreted sensibly in light of 
the purpose of the subdivision. The relevant inquiry is whether 
D, because of an employment relationship with an employer who 
has a significant stake in the outcome of the transaction, is likely 
to be influenced to act in the interest of that employer rather than 
in the interest of X Co. 
6. FAIR TO THE CORPORATION 
The term "fair** accords with traditional language in the case 
law, but for purposes of subchapter F it also has a special mean-
ing. The transaction, viewed as a whole, must have been bene-
ficial to the corporation, in addition to satisfying the traditional 
4
 'fair price1 * and * 'fair dealing* * concepts. In determining whether 
the transaction was beneficial, the consideration and other terms 
of the transaction and the process (including the conflicted direc-
tor* s dealings with the corporation) are relevant, but whether the 
transaction advanced the corporation's commercial interests is to 
be viewed "as a whole." 
In considering the "fairness*' of the transaction, the court will 
be required to consider not only the market fairness of the terms 
of the deal—whether it is comparable to what might have been 
obtainable in an arm*s length transaction— 
but also (as the board would have been required to do) 
whether the transaction was one that was reasonably likely to 
yield favorable results (or reduce detrimental results). Thus, if a 
manufacturing company that lacks sufficient working capital al-
locates some of its scarce funds to purchase a sailing yacht owned 
by one of its directors, it will not be easy to persuade the court 
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that the transaction was "fair" in the sense that it was reasonably 
made to further the business interests of the corporation. The facts 
that the price paid for the yacht was a "fair" market price, and 
that the fall measure of disclosures made by the diirector is beyond 
challenge, may still not be enough to defend and uphold the trans-
action. 
<L Consideration and other terms of the transaction 
The fairness of the consideration and other transaction terms 
are to be judged at the relevant time. The relevant inquiry is 
whether the consideration paid or received by the corporation or 
the benefit expected to be realized by the corporation was ade-
quate in relation to the obligations assumed or received or other 
consideration provided by or to the corporation. If the issue in a 
transaction is the "fairness*' of a price, "fair" is not to be taken 
to imply that there is one single "fair" pride, all others being 
"unfair." It is settled law that a "fair" price is any price within 
a range that an unrelated party might have been willing to pay or 
willing to accept, as the case may be, for the relevant property, 
asset, service or commitment, following a nonrnd arm's-length 
business negotiation. The same approach applies not only to 
gauging the fairness of price, but also to the fairness evaluation 
of any other key term of the deal. 
Although the "fair" criterion used to assess the consideration 
under section 8.61(b)(3) is also a range rather than a point, the 
width of that range may be narrower than would be the case in 
an arm's-length transaction. For example, the quality and com-
pleteness of disclosures, if any, made by the conliicted director 
that bear upon the consideration in question are relevant in de-
termining whether the consideration paid or received by the cor-
poration, although otherwise commercially reasonable, was 
"fair" for purposes of section 8.61(b)(3). 
b. Process of decision and the director's conduct 
In some circumstances, the behavior of the director having 
the conflicting interest may affect the finding and content of ''fair-
ness." Fair dealing requires that the director make required dis-
closure (per subdivision (7)) at the relevant time (per subdivision 
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(3)) even if the director plays no role in arranging or negotiating 
the terms of the transaction. One illustration of unfair dealing is 
the director's failure to disclose fully the director's interest or 
hidden defects known to the director regarding the transaction. 
Another illustration would be the exertion by the director of im-
proper pressure upon the other directors or other parties that might 
be involved with the transaction. Whether a transaction can be 
successfully challenged by reason of deficient or improper con-
duct, notwithstanding the fairness of the economic terms, will 
turn on the court's evaluation of the conduct and its impact on 
the transaction. 
7. REQUIRED DISCLOSURE 
A critically important element of subchapter F's safe harbor 
procedures is that those acting for the corporation be able to make 
an informed judgment. In view of this requirement, subdivision 
(7) defines "required disclosure" to mean disclosure of all facts 
known to D about the subject of the transaction that a director 
free of the conflicting interest would reasonably believe to be 
material to the decision whether to proceed with the transaction. 
For example, if D knows that the land the corporation is propos-
ing to buy from D is sinking into an abandoned coal mine, D 
must disclose not only D's interest in the transaction but also that 
the land is subsiding. As a director of X Co., D may not invoke 
caveat emptor. On the other hand, D does not have any obligation 
to reveal the price that D paid for the property ten years ago, or 
the fact that D inherited the property, because that information is 
not material to the board's evaluation of the property and its busi-
ness decision whether to proceed with the transaction. Further, 
while material facts respecting the subject of the transaction must 
be disclosed, D is not required to reveal personal or subjective 
information that bears upon D's negotiating position (such as, for 
example, D's urgent need for cash, or the lowest price D would 
be willing to accept). This is true even though such information 
would be highly relevant to the corporation's decisionmaking in 
the sense that, if the information were known to the corporation, 
it could enable the corporation to hold out for more favorable 
terms. 
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